Showing posts with label UNSW. Show all posts
Showing posts with label UNSW. Show all posts

Friday, 11 January 2008

OPQs 18 September 2007: Public Lecture by Professor Emeritus Douglas Sanders and UNSW Asia

The first OPQ here was about a public lecture by Professor Emeritus Douglas Sanders that was initially approved by the police, but the permit was subsequently withdrawn. Alex Au's account made it all seem a little farcical, and I wanted to know exactly what had happened.

The second OPQ here was about UNSW Asia. This was filed in the wake of a news story about UNSW Asia's possible insolvency, which could have affected the Singapore government's ability to recover the money that it had loaned and/or disbursed to UNSW Asia. Since detailed facts about what had been going on with UNSW Asia were not forthcoming, I decided to try to find out.

OPQs

PUBLIC LECTURE BY PROFESSOR EMERITUS DOUGLAS SANDERS
(Reasons for cancellation of public entertainment licence)

6. Mr Baey Yam Keng asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs (a) what are the reasons for the change in assessment of the permit for Prof. Emeritus Douglas Sanders' public lecture after the permit was previously approved; and (b) what is the number of similar cancellations of approved permits in the past five years and what are the main reasons for their cancellation.

7. Mr Siew Kum Hong asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs (a) why was a public entertainment licence initially granted for a public lecture on 7th August 2007 by Prof. Emeritus Douglas Sanders; and (b) what circumstances had changed to result in the cancellation of the licence.

The Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs (Assoc. Prof. Ho Peng Kee) (for the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs): Sir, may I take Question Nos. 6 and 7 together?

Mr Speaker: Yes, please.

Assoc. Prof. Ho Peng Kee: Sir, Police assesses each application for a public entertainment licence (PEL) carefully based on the information available. After approving a licence, Police will continue to monitor developments. There may be circumstances under which Police may re-assess the application and cancel the public entertainment licence, if necessary, for public safety, good order or public interest reasons.

In the case of the public lecture on 7th August, after careful deliberation, Police assessed that the event was contrary to the public interest and cancelled the licence for the event. This was because it became subsequently clear to Police that the event was part of the efforts of gay activists to promote their political agenda which involved a foreigner. Our laws are an expression and reflection of the values of our society and any public discourse in Singapore on such matters should be reserved for Singaporeans. Foreigners will not be allowed to interfere in our domestic political scene, whether in support of the gay cause or against it.

There has been no similar cancellation of a licence granted for talks by foreign speakers in the past five years. This is because Police is usually able to make a decision whether to approve or reject a licence application based on the information available. As I have said earlier, in the case of the public lecture by Prof. Sanders, Police decided to cancel the licence based on additional information which subsequently came to its knowledge.

Mr Michael Palmer (Pasir Ris-Punggol): Mr Speaker, two supplementary questions. The first is, given that the permit or the licence was approved and then cancelled four days before the event, will this affect Singapore's reputation of having a stable operating environment where there are sudden U-turn decisions? The second supplementary question, if foreigners should interfere in local politics and local policies, many foreign experts are engaged by the Government to comment and advise on local policies, are we saying that the Government is permitted to engage foreigners in policy making to the exclusion of initiatives by the civil society?

Assoc. Prof. Ho Peng Kee: Sir, I understand that the event did go ahead. In other words, even though the PEL was cancelled for the event, the condition was that there should be no foreigners speaking in it. But as long as there are no foreigners speaking in it, you will not need a talk which is indoors. In any case, Sir, the information subsequently came to the Police shortly before it withdrew the PEL on 3rd August, which was the full four days before the talk. In other words, Police acted as expeditiously as it could.

On the other question, the context is important. It is not as though that foreigners cannot make their comments or views known on Singapore's policies and laws. In fact, they all do. But it is quite different if in the context of a situation in Singapore where we know that there is an ongoing debate for some time already on a topic which is divisive, a topic which has caused two sides in particular to expound different points of views. From what we know, Prof. Douglas Sanders who is a known advocate for the human rights of the gays and lesbians to take a position - we can hear his views on the air or read it online - it is quite different to invite him here to speak to a Singapore audience at this time.

Mr Siew Kum Hong (Nominated Member): Sir, two supplementary questions. My first question is whether the Minister can clarify what is the nature of the additional information that led to the licence being cancelled. I am asking that because there could be a concern that the Police did not fully deliberate the circumstances of the application before they granted it the first time round. My second question is whether the Police had considered granting the licence subject to conditions. This is because, as I understand it, the application was for a talk on international trends outside Singapore. So the application itself did not cover Singapore at all. If that was the case, would the Police have considered granting the licence subject to the condition that the speaker did not touch on Singapore?

Assoc. Prof. Ho Peng Kee: Sir, the information was made available to Police which was the information online. Essentially, the context of the original application was for a talk, as Mr Siew has said, on a topic which looked innocuous enough, which was "Sexual Orientation in International Law: The Case of Asia". So it appeared to be a lecture highlighting Prof. Sanders' research and comparing the laws of Europe and Asia. But subsequent to that, like I have said, Police came across information available online. We then understood the larger context which was really part of a two-week stretch of events where local activists had organised several other events, such as talks, exhibitions, forums, etc, which promoted the gay cause.

I think the Police have a better understanding of the background of Prof. Sanders, in particular, there was another talk which was also publicised online, an intended talk by Prof. Sanders at another place, which led Police to believe that Prof. Sanders was likely to talk about our section 377A which is the criminalising of homosexual sex. And also, in terms of the background of Prof. Sanders, Police subsequently came to the knowledge that, in fact, he was an advocate for the criminalising of homosexual sex who had spoken, for example, at the United Nations. That is the context. It was not taken lightly. Neither was it a case where Police just approved without careful consideration. Police did approve carefully, based on the information then available.

Mr Speaker: Mr Siew, one last question.

Mr Siew Kum Hong: Sir, I have two supplementary questions. My first question is whether the Police had fully investigated the background of the speaker before they granted the licence the first time around because I am sure that the information was available online when they were considering the first application. The MOS has referred to another talk. I would just like to ask whether the other talk was in Singapore and whether a licence has been granted for the other talk and, if so, when is it.

Assoc. Prof. Ho Peng Kee: The first point is, like I have said, the Police assessed the application according to the information made available to it. So the applicant would have to furnish the information. So, here, the curriculum vitae of Prof. Sanders that was given to Police did not indicate, for example, his involvement in the UN or the fact that the written articles which talked about our local equivalent of section 377A. The other talk was organised by a body and because it was a statutory body under a parent Ministry, it did not require a licence.

UNSW ASIA
(Financial obligations)

10. Mr Siew Kum Hong asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) whether the obligations of UNSW Asia are subject to a guarantee by the parent university in Australia; and (b) whether the Economic Development Board, when negotiating an agreement with a university intending to invest in Singapore, takes any measures to ensure that the university fulfills its financial obligations to its academic staff if the venture fails.

The Minister of State for Trade and Industry (Mr S Iswaran) (for the Minister for Trade and Industry): Mr Speaker, Sir, EDB generally does not require parent companies to give any over-arching guarantee on their Singapore operations. For companies who invest in Singapore, it is in their own interest to see that their Singapore operation is successful. Companies also value this operational flexibility. It makes Singapore an attractive place for business. This is also the case for educational institutions. The parent institutions have a strong interest to make sound business decisions about facilities, employees and students. If their Singapore operation fails, the parent institution will suffer significant reputational and financial loss.

The Minister for Trade and Industry has previously informed this House that as UNSW will not be able to meet its commitments to EDB, UNSW is required to return the disbursed loan and grant to EDB. The loan is backed by a bank guarantee. For the grants that had been given to UNSW Asia, EDB is currently in discussions with UNSW on its recovery.

Organisations based in Singapore are bounded by our laws and regulations. EDB does not interfere in the university's decision on employment policies beyond our legal requirements. The employment contract is negotiated and agreed upon by the university and its employees. Employees are encouraged to seek legal advice on their rights and consult with the university directly.

Mr Siew Kum Hong: My first supplementary question is to clarify whether the grants were disbursed to UNSW or UNSW Asia, and who would we be calling that back from because, as I understand it from the press reports, UNSW Asia is very much insolvent, in which case, unless you can get it back from UNSW, the parent university, there is not much chance of getting funds back.

My second question is with respect to the MOS' answer on the EDB not interfering with employment contracts. The number of academic staff at UNSW Asia had uprooted to come to Singapore, and this whole event has left them with a very unpleasant aftertaste when it comes to Singapore. My question to the MOS is whether the EDB and the Ministry accept that the reputation of Singapore is important and that, therefore, it is beneficial to invest some effort into ensuring that the reputation is not affected when things go bad.

Mr Iswaran: Mr Speaker, Sir, as far as the grant is concerned, the legal entity is the UNSW Asia. But as the Member has pointed out, the negotiation is now with the parent, UNSW, and the process is now one of engaging them in a discussion and negotiation to settle the final terms.

As far as the second point is concerned, on the impact on Singapore's reputation, I think in a way this is no different from any other investments we have attracted to Singapore. The implicit presumption in the Member's point is that somehow the employment situation in this particular instance has a wider implication on Singapore. All these institutions that we attract, that EDB courts to come in are usually very reputable and of international standing. They have a vested interest to protect their reputation, and that includes ensuring that they comply with the laws of the land in terms of employment legislation and treating their staff fairly. From public accounts and reports in the media, it would appear that that seems to be the nature of the engagement between the parties concerned.

EDB rightly confines itself to what is really its remit, to ensure that the parties we attract to Singapore comply with our laws and that means all laws, including our labour laws, and then we leave it to the businesses to work it out. Whether they are university professors or engineers and wafer fabrication plants or indeed any other foreign talent or workers coming into Singapore, ultimately, their contracts would bind their obligations.

Wednesday, 15 August 2007

OPQ 16 July 2007: University of New South Wales

I know that this is probably a little dated, and in future I'll try to be more current in my updates on Parliamentary sittings. But in light of the recent news that UNSW Asia may be declaring itself insolvent and hence unable to repay all of its debts, I think there's still some currency to this.

In fact, I've filed an OPQ for the August sitting, to ask whether the EDB extracted any guarantees from the parent university in Australia when negotiating the packages (fairly common in commercial transactions), and whether the EDB had sought to extract any protection for UNSW Asia's staff (from news reports, it seems that they are really being left to the mercy of UNSW).

In any case, I think it's worth setting out in detail some of the more interesting parts of the debate on UNSW Asia during the sitting on 16 July 2007. I filed an OPQ, and also asked two supplementary questions.

The first supplementary question was about our ability to recover grants that had been disbursed. The Minister had stated that the grants were disbursed to help UNSW Asia build up their initial capacity, and were "given for different milestones". I took it to mean that different grants were made for different milestones, and UNSW Asia may have achieved some of those milestones, in which case theoretically we would not be entitled to recover those grants. So I wanted to clarify this. From the Minister's response, it seems that none of the milestones had been reached, and so in principle, we should be able to recover all of the grants disbursed.

The second supplementary question was about the amount of attention paid to protecting enrolled students during negotiations, which was something I had asked about in my OPQ but was not covered by the Minister's initial response. His reply to my OPQ also did not touch on what was done -- or not done -- during negotiations, but instead reiterated what actions were taken in reaction to the closure. I can then only infer that this was not something that was discussed during negotiations.

Throughout this entire affair, it seemed to me, from the Government's tone and language, that they saw it as a case of UNSW asking us to pour money down a bottomless pit, to essentially bear the financial risk for UNSW (through the revisions to the already-agreed support package that were repeatedly requested by UNSW) without any commitment from UNSW in return. The Government seemed to come from the position that they were dealing with public funds, and so had to be careful how those funds were to be spent.

And all that is well and good. But I thought public opinion was a little different. It also focused on public funds, but in terms of accountability, and also in terms of the pre-emptive planning (if any) by the authorities to prevent students and academic staff from being unduly affected in case of just such an event. I still think that the EDB failed on the accountability test, since it had persistently declined to state the figures involved all the way until the Parliamentary sitting (and yes, I did notice that nothing was said about those confidentiality obligations that the EDB sought to rely on to justify its silence).

And I think we also failed on the front of protecting students and staff. Yes, I know, caveat emptor and so on and so forth, there is always such a risk when someone quits and joins a new set-up, etc etc etc. But we need to remember that Singapore's plans to be a "Global Schoolhouse" are heavily premised on trust -- trust in the Singapore brand, trust that Singapore institutions are reliable, honest and of satisfactory quality, trust that none of these bad things that have happened in the private education sector this past year will happen in Singapore. I'm not sure if that trust is being eroded, both by the UNSW fiasco and by the Government's continued non-regulation of the private education sector.

Surely the preservation of the Singapore brand and the trust that is so implicit in it is an objective important enough to warrant us trying to secure guarantees from such universities as to what would happen to their students and staff in case of a failure. Contingency planning is something everyone is familiar with, so why not in this case? Unfortunately, the answers to this particular question still elude us, and I'm not sure if I can extract them in Parliament either.

OPQ
UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES ASIA
(Impact of pullout and related issues)

5. Mr Inderjit Singh asked the Minister for Trade and Industry, in light of the recent pullouts by the University of New South Wales in 2007 and John Hopkins University in 2006, (a) if he will explain why Singapore has not been able to retain its foreign universities; and (b) whether he is confident that we will be able to continue to attract reputable universities to set up campus in Singapore.

6. Mr Seah Kian Peng asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) how does the pullout of the University of New South Wales Asia affect Singapore as an education hub; (b) what were the considerations that led to this pullout; and (c) how much of this can be attributed to the expectations of the Economic Development Board in terms of student enrolment.

7. Dr Lim Wee Kiak asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what are the Ministry's plans to make Singapore an education hub; (b) how has the withdrawal of the University of New South Wales from Singapore affected Singapore's image as an education hub; (c) what are the reasons for the University's decision to withdraw from Singapore; and (d) what were the University's needs which the Economic Development Board was unable to accede to.

8. Prof. Thio Li-ann asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) how much has been spent by the Government on the UNSW Asia project and what are our outstanding liabilities to third parties such as banks, construction companies and other service providers; and (b) what is being worked out with UNSW in relation to financial compensation payable to Singapore.

9. Mr Siew Kum Hong asked the Minister for Trade and Industry (a) during the negotiations between the Economic Development Board (EDB) and University of New South Wales (UNSW), what safeguards were taken to mitigate the risk of UNSW pulling out from Singapore; (b) how were the interests of enrolled students protected; and (c) in view of UNSW's public statements on its liability and losses arising out of its pullout and its duty to report to the Australian Parliament, whether EDB remains bound by confidentiality obligations and, if so, why.

10. Ms Eunice Elizabeth Olsen asked the Minister for Trade and Industry in the memoranda of understanding with foreign educational institutions setting up in Singapore, how is due emphasis given to secure adequate commitment to these projects so as to ensure that they are not easily abandoned.

The Minister for Trade and Industry (Mr Lim Hng Kiang): Sir, with your permission, may I take Question Nos. 5 to 10 together?

Mr Speaker: Yes.

Mr Lim Hng Kiang: Mr Speaker, Sir, I thank Members for their questions and interest in the UNSW project and the broader issue of what this means for Singapore as a global education hub.

Let me first give the background of the UNSW project.

[...]

Mr Speaker, Sir, UNSW's decision is a business decision. While we as Government can play a role in giving support to investors who want to set up operations in Singapore, we cannot issue a blank cheque. We must ensure that public funds are well utilised and yield strong benefits to Singapore. EDB's support package for UNSW was therefore premised on the basis that UNSW would undertake a long-term commitment to establish a university of significant scale in Singapore that will create new economic value. EDB's grants and loans are conditional on UNSW achieving pre-agreed milestones such as student enrolment, failing which they become recoverable.

To date, EDB has disbursed S$15 million in loans and S$17.3 million in grants to UNSW. As UNSW will not be able to meet the performance indicators that it committed to EDB in 2004 and 2006, UNSW is required to return the disbursed loan and grant to EDB. The disbursed loan is backed by a bank guarantee. EDB is currently discussing with UNSW on the recovery of the disbursed grant. The Government does not have any outstanding liabilities to third parties with regard to the UNSW project.

We regret UNSW's decision to pull out, but this is their business decision and we will have to respect it. The Government's bigger concern was the impact of UNSW's decision on the students. EDB therefore worked closely with UNSW and the Ministry of Education to assist the affected students.

[...]

Dr Lim Wee Kiak: Mr Speaker, Sir, I would like to thank the Minister for the very comprehensive answer. I understand surely that it is not the Ministry's role to evaluate the business plan. But, however, I understand that all business plans must have contingencies before the Government itself gives out any funding or grant. I am sure the Government has evaluated in terms of their plans and any contingency if the enrolment drops below the projected numbers. So, I am wondering whether these contingency plans were evaluated and, if they were, why these contingency plans were not implemented.

Mr Lim Hng Kiang: The support package that EDB provided for UNSW was, essentially, in two parts. One was loans to help build the campus, and that loan was backed by a bank guarantee. So if they do not build, of course, we can recall the loan. The second support package was a set of grants to help them build up their capabilities, particularly in the science laboratories. So, of course, if they do not build the science laboratories, the grants are not disbursed. We also gave out some grants to help them build up the initial capacity, and they were the grants that were disbursed at the early stages, so that they could start up their operation and build up initial capacity. So, the grants were given for different milestones, and for those which were given at the startup to help them come in, those were the grants that were disbursed, and that is the S$17 million that we have to recover now.

[...]

Mr Siew Kum Hong (Nominated Member): Sir, I have two supplementary questions. Firstly, I would like to ask the Minister, of the grants that were already disbursed, how much was disbursed where the milestones have already been reached, which will make them non-refundable to Singapore. My second question is: in the course of the various negotiations and discussions with EDB, I would like to ask the Minister what pre-emptive measures and steps were taken to minimise the impact on students. Because, at the end of the day, I think these students stay in Singapore to study in UNSW and those plans have been fundamentally changed. So, I would like to know when we negotiated with the university, how much consideration was given to their interests.

Mr Lim Hng Kiang: Mr Speaker, Sir, as I explained just now, the grants were disbursed, essentially, as startup grants to build up the capacity and, because they have not met the required commitments, these grants can be clawed back. So, we are discussing with UNSW Asia to see how they can return us the grants that were disbursed to them.

As for the students and the very sudden closure, this is something unfortunate. Even up to May, we were still discussing with the UNSW Asia how to continue the operations. But, at the same time, we cannot provide them with a blank cheque. Obviously, they must show commitment to undertake the milestones and the projects as indicated to us. As I said in my reply, we were prepared to give them two years to let the operations settle down. Then, they can give us a new plan with the scaled-down projection and we will support them commensurate with the benefits that the new scaled-down plan will give to Singapore. But the university decided that they are taking unnecessarily a high level of operational and financial risks, and so they decided to close down. Once they had made the decision to close down, both sides worked very closely to try and mitigate the impact on the students. I must say UNSW Asia went out of its way in providing the scholarships, in talking to the students, to make sure that the students' welfare was taken care of. On our side, EDB and the Ministry of Education also worked closely with UNSW Asia to make sure the students were looked after.

Mdm Cynthia Phua (Aljunied): Can the Minister clearly let us know what is his assessment of the recovery of the amount of $17 million that has been granted? I note that the sum has been spent. But how can you recover it? The second question is this. We know that there are many Singaporean students who have taken the foundation course, and I understand that the university is still continuing with this foundation course. Would our own universities recognise these students who have undertaken the foundation course for the next year's university entry as well?

Mr Lim Hng Kiang: We are still in the process of discussing with UNSW Asia on the recovery of these grants. So, I cannot give an estimate of how successful we will be. As far as the foundation course and the future admission to our local universities are concerned, I think this can be better answered by Minister Tharman later on.

[...]

Thursday, 31 May 2007

The faculty of accountability

TODAY published this article yesterday. To me, UNSW's departure demonstrates the downside of the steadfast pursuit of foreign investments that we continually engage in. Here, it was students' dreams that were shattered -- in the case of MNCs, it is workers' livelihoods. The three local universities cannot uproot and leave, the way UNSW has.

The lesson then is that we need to develop a strong domestic commercial sector that can at least partially wean us off foreign investment. We are still quite a long way off -- just see the paucity of homegrown global brand names. Citing the usual suspects like Singapore Airlines (and I would really leave out Creative) simply proves my point.

On the same day, TODAY also published a letter from EDB that sought to clarify what happened. EDB cited confidentiality obligations as the reason for not disclosing the support package offered, and I suppose that's also why it could not disclose the extent of losses (since the losses are due to the support package).

But then, why is that UNSW could cite its loss of A$17.5 (S$22) million? Also, The Financial Times has reported the figure of S$80 million as EDB's loss. If that is correct, then this information has entered the public domain and is, as a matter of law, no longer confidential. If it is not correct, then the information remains confidential, but EDB is entitled to deny that the figure is correct -- something that EDB has not done at all.

So I don't really see EDB's letter as being sufficient to address the calls for true accountability.

Note: I'm told that there was a factual error, in that MOE was not involved in the negotiations to bring UNSW to Singapore. I had stated that, based on previous news reports I had read. TODAY will run a correction tomorrow. I stand corrected and would like to apologise to MOE for any discomfort or embarrassment from this error. Having said that, I still believe that MOE has some degree of responsibility to account to the public for what had happened here -- I cannot imagine that MOE had no part to play in regulating UNSW's affairs. And you really cannot purport to regulate without taking responsibility when things go wrong.

The faculty of accountability

In the Singapore model, mitigating the risks when things go wrong is crucial

Wednesday • May 30, 2007

Siew Kum Hong

Anger, disbelief, fear, shock and tears. Those were just some of the reactions to the University of New South Wales (UNSW) Asia's announcement that it was giving up after just one term. Even as UNSW, the Economic Development Board (EDB), the Ministry of Education (MOE) and other educational institutions (including the three local universities) continue to try to help UNSW students deal with the aftermath, there are other issues that merit debate on a more macro level.

The first concerns the accountability of government agencies. The MOE had reportedly played an important role in attracting UNSW to Singapore in the first place. Furthermore, all private schools must register with the MOE. Yet, when students and parents wanted to meet with the latter after UNSW's decision, the MOE's response was that UNSW had ultimate responsibility.

As for the EDB, it had sealed the deal with UNSW and had invested heavily in the project. Yet, it has declined to reveal the losses resulting from UNSW's pullout. While disclosing the figures could affect the EDB's bargaining position in future negotiations with other universities, the fact remains that this is taxpayers' money. The Financial Times has reported the amount to be as high as $80 million.

The EDB has also not provided information on how the deal was structured. What sort of guarantees and commitments were extracted from UNSW? How could UNSW simply quit after just one term, when construction work on the new campus was already underway, apparently without having to pay compensation?

Did we give away too much to lure UNSW here?

The onus is on the EDB to explain what had happened and give an indication of our losses, while not compromising its ability to negotiate future deals. Its continued silence does not sit well with Singaporeans, particularly in light of the Public Accounts Committee's recent findings of significant lapses in the EDB's internal controls and governance.

Singaporeans expect greater accountability from ministers and civil servants, given the recent public service pay hike. The handling of this case may not have met the enhanced standards expected by the public.

A more fundamental question concerns the Singapore model, which relies heavily on foreign investments to drive the economy. UNSW's departure demonstrates the risks inherent in playing this game, especially in an increasingly globalised world where competitors are everywhere and funds come and go easily.

Investors are understandably fickle, coming to seek returns and leaving if there are none. As with UNSW and other multinational corporations, when they pull out, Singaporeans have to pick up the pieces, whether they be lost jobs, missed opportunities or dashed dreams.

This could come without warning, such as when there is a management change and hardnosed businessmen such as UNSW vice-chancellor Professor Fred Hilmer disagree with the previous decisions made.

So long as we persist with this economic model, the risk will remain. I am not saying we should abandon this model — it has served us well in the past, and it could continue to work for the future.

But we have to be aware of the inherent risks, make sure our eyes are open to what could happen if things go wrong, and do our best to mitigate the risks. Just as foreign investments have a multiplier effect on the economy, the negative repercussions of capital outflows will similarly be amplified.

And that brings us back to the EDB's role in attracting investments. Yes, capital should be able to flow in and out of Singapore freely, and we cannot stop an investor from leaving. But surely it is not too much to ask that where public funds are spent to entice foreign investments, we also extract some assurances and commitments to stay in Singapore. This not only minimises the wastage of taxpayers' money, but also mitigates the risk of lives being disrupted by premature departures.

Ultimately, our model of foreign investments requires us to keep foreign investors happy, to ensure that the business case presented is realistic and justifiable, and to ensure a long-term binding commitment. But, at the same time, we must not lose sight of the need to grow indigenous players who can compete internationally while retaining local roots. Otherwise, we will always remain hostage to the whims of foreign investors.

The writer is a Nominated Member of Parliament and a corporate counsel, commenting in his personal capacity.